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Introduction 
This study aims to analyse the key differences between the three Association 
Agreements (AAs) the EU concluded with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Whereas 
the ‘3 DCFTA’ project already analysed in detail the scope, contents and 
implementation perspectives of these agreements in three separate ‘handsbooks’,1 
this contribution will explore the most important differences between these landmark 
agreements.  
The texts of these three agreements are very similar for various reasons. First, these 
agreements were developed in the same policy framework, i.e. the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). When the EaP was 
launched in 2009, one of the key objectives of the EU was to conclude a new 
generation of association agreements with the partner countries establishing an 
ambitious form of political association and economic integration. The latter objective 
had to be realised by the conclusion of “Deep and Comprehensive” Free Trade Areas 
(DCFTAs). These ambitious trade agreements, which are new included in the 3 AAs, 
do not only open up markets for trade in goods but cover all relevant trade-related 
areas such as services, public procurement, technical barriers to trade (TBT), 
intellectual property rights (IPR), etc. Moreover, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have 
committed themselves (soft or strong obligations) to approximate to a substantial 
selection of EU legislation, which in several areas can lead to a far-reaching 
integration into the EU Internal Market. 
Secondly, the starting point of the AA negotiations was also very similar for the three 
countries. Each of them concluded in the mid-nineties comparable Partnership- and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) which provided for a similar level of limited 
economic cooperation (without the establishment of a FTA) and political cooperation. 
The legal framework was therefore very similar at the start of the AA negotiations for 
the three countries.  
Thirdly, the Moldova and Georgia AAs were clearly modelled upon the Ukraine 
agreement, which was the first of this new generation of association agreements. 
The EU-Ukraine AA negotiations were launched in March 2007 (but the DCFTA 
                                       
1 The handbooks can be downloaded at http://www.3dcftas.eu  
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negotiations were only launched in February 2008 after Ukraine’s WTO membership 
was assured), and the text of the agreement was initialled in March 2012 (political 
part) and July 2012 (DCFTA). The AA negotiations with Moldova and Georgia were 
only launched in, respectively, January and July 2010 and were initialled2 during the 
Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2013. EU negotiators recognised 
that they used the Ukraine agreement as a ‘blueprint’ for Georgia and Moldova and 
also the Council’s negotiating directives for the Moldova and Georgia AAs were very 
similar to the one adopted for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the AAs with Moldova and 
Georgia entered into force on 1 July 2016. The Ukraine AA is largely provisionally 
applied since 1 November 2014 (political part) and 1 January 2016 (DCFTA) and will 
fully enter into force after the EU’s ratification.3 
Therefore, the three AAs and DCFTAs have a very similar structure, provisions and 
level of market opening. However, in the light of the EU’s differentiation and joint-
ownership approach in the ENP, there are a number of important differences in the 
agreement.4 For example, the Commission stressed from the outset that the DCFTAs 
had to be “tailored and sequenced carefully to take into account of each partner 
country’s economic circumstances and state of development”.5 Indeed, the three 
countries had a rather different approach towards the AA negotiations. For example, 
whereas Ukrainian negotiators strongly pushed for transitional mechanisms and 
safeguard measures in several areas of the DCFTA to protect their domestic market 
(e.g. in the area of cars and export duties), Georgia had already unilaterally 
liberalised and deregulated important sectors of its economy during the economic 
reforms in under the Saakashvilli period. For the same reason Georgian negotiators 
were also more reluctant towards far-reaching approximation commitments as they 
were afraid that this could overregulate their economy. The Moldovan negotiators on 
the other had a more ambitious ‘approximation friendly’ stance vis-à-vis its DCFTA. 
This paper will first compare the political chapters of the AAs (2). Then, the DCFTAs 
(3) and the AAs’ Titles on Economic and Sector Cooperation (4) and General and 
Final Provisions (5) are explored. 
                                       
2 The DCFTA negotiations with Moldova and Georgia were launched in February 2012 and were 
concluded with Moldova in June 2013 and with Georgia in July 2013. 
3 At the moment of writing this paper, the agreement was already ratified by all the Member States, 
but not yet by the EU, which is expected soon.  
4 For a recent analysis on of the ENP, including on the concept of joint ownership and differentiation, 
see H. Kostanyan (Ed), Assessing the European Neighbourhood Policy: Perspectives from the 
literature (Rowman and Littlefield International - CEPS, London, 2017). 
5 European Commission, ‘ENP- A path towards further economic integration. Non-paper expanding on 
the proposals contained in the Communication “Strengthening the ENP” COM(2006) 726, p. 6. 
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1. The political chapters of the AAs 
1.1 The AA’s objectives and (lack of) EU membership perspective  
The objectives of the agreements enshrined in the preamble and Article 1 of the AAs 
are very similar. All three agreements aim “to promote political association and 
economic integration between the Parties based on common values and close links”, 
to provide for an institutional framework for political dialogue and to promote, 
preserve and strengthen peace and stability in the regional and international 
dimensions in accordance with international law. In addition, the agreements 
envisage strengthening cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice with 
the aim of reinforcing the rule of law and the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedom; and to establish conditions for enhanced economic and trade 
relations leading  to the partner countries gradual integration into to EU Internal 
Market, including by setting up a DCFTA and legislative approximation. The 
preambles also envisage to strengthen cooperation in the area of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and 
sectoral areas such as energy, climate-change, the fight against organised crime, 
cross-border and regional cooperation and environmental protection.  
There are however two notable differences between the Ukraine AA on the one hand 
and the Georgia and Moldova AAs on the other. First, only the preamble of the 
Georgia and Moldova AAs refer to the ENP and the EaP as the policy frameworks in 
which these agreements are embedded. The explicit reference to the ENP and the 
EaP anchors these policy’s objectives and principles in the bilateral legal framework 
between the EU and these two countries. Second, the Moldova and Georgia AAs 
include in Article 1 a specific objective in the light of their ‘frozen conflicts’ and 
breakaway regions. With regard to the objective of promotion and strengthening of 
peace and stability in the regional and international dimension, both agreements add 
that the parties aim to “join […] efforts to eliminate sources of tension, enhancing 
border security, promoting cross-border cooperation and good neighbourly relations”. 
In the light of the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, the Georgia agreement even explicitly 
aims “to promote cooperation aimed at the peaceful conflict resolution”. However, 
only the preamble of the agreements explicitly refers to Transnistria or 
Abkhazia/South Ossetia.6 Because the text of the agreement of the EU-Ukraine AA 
was initialled before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the conflict in 
                                       
6 For example, the preamble of the Moldova AA states that the parties are “recognising the 
importance of the commitment of the Republic of Moldova to a viable settlement of the Transnistrian 
conflict, and the EU’s commitment to supporting post-conflict rehabilitation”. The preamble of the 
Georgia AA on the other hand states that the parties are recognising “the importance of the 
commitment of Georgia to reconciliation and its efforts to restore its territorial integrity and full and 
effective control over Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhnivali region/South Ossetia in pursuit 
of a peaceful and lasting conflict resolution […]” and “the importance of pursuing the implementation 
of the 12th August 2008 Six-Point Agreement and its subsequent implementing measures […]”. 
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eastern Ukraine, this situation is not addressed in the EU-Ukraine AA (see also 
below).  
All three agreements also remain silent about EU accession. Despite the efforts of the 
partner countries during the negotiations, the EU refused to include an explicit (long-
term) membership perspective in the agreement. Instead, the agreements include 
diplomatic language on the three countries’ membership ambitions, “recognising” 
them as a “European countries” sharing a common history and common values and 
acknowledging their “European aspirations and European choice”. However, the 
agreements do not preclude a membership perspective as they state that they “shall 
not prejudice and leave open future developments”. Only the Georgia AA includes a 
notable difference. Its preamble recognises Georgia as an “Eastern European 
country” and not as a “European country”, such as it is the case for Ukraine and 
Moldova. Most likely, this differentiation is included to distinguish the countries in the 
southern Caucasus geographically from the ‘European’ EaP countries. The relations 
between this formulation and Article 49 TEU, pursuant to which only “European 
States” are eligible for EU Membership, is unclear. It has been argued that this 
“eastern” tag was included to preclude an accession perspective for Georgia. 
However, similar to the Ukraine and Moldova AAs, the Georgia AA also state that it 
“leaves open the way for future progressive developments in EU-Georgia relations”. 
Like in all EU association agreements, the three EaP AAs include a similar ‘general 
principle clause’ (Article 2) defining the “essential elements” of the bilateral 
relationship, and which is linked to a suspension clause. Violation by one party of 
these essential elements can lead to immediate suspension of the agreement by the 
other party. All three AAs refer to respect for democratic principles, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as defined in several international agreements and 
conventions. However, only the EU-Ukraine AA defines “respect for the principle of 
the rule of law” and “promotion of respect for the principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence” as essential elements.  
Also the institutional framework of the agreements is almost identical. At the top of 
the institutional pyramid is the Association Council, composed out of members of the 
EU Council and the Commission on the one hand and members of the government of 
the partner country, on the other. The Association Councils are the main institution 
to monitor and supervise the application and implementation of the agreement. The 
Association Council is assisted by the Association Committee, which is on its turn 
assisted by specific sub-committees. The only notable difference between the three 
agreements is that only the EU-Ukraine AA provides for a legal basis for annual EU-
Ukraine summits, which will hold “the highest level of political and policy dialogue” 
and “provide overall guidance for the implementation of [the agreement] as well as 
an opportunity to discuss any bilateral or international issues”. Such summits, which 
were already a practice before the AA, are not hold with Moldova and Georgia. 
THE EU'S ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS AND DCFTAS WITH UKRAINE, MOLDOVA GEORGIA | 5 
Nevertheless, these countries hold multilateral Summits with the EU in the 
framework of the Eastern Partnership.  
1.2 Cooperation in the area of CFSP  
The agreements also include similar provisions related to political dialogue and 
cooperation in the area of CFSP. On several points the EU-Ukraine AA is a bit more 
ambitious than the other two agreements. For example, all three agreements 
envisage practical cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management, in 
particular with a view to possible participation in EU-led civilian and military crisis 
management operations as well as relevant exercises and training. However, only the 
EU-Ukraine AA explicitly envisages close cooperation between Ukraine and the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) to strengthen military-technical cooperation. 
However, with regard to combatting terrorism, illicit trade of small arms and light 
weapons and conventional arms exports control, the provisions in the Moldova and 
Georgia AAs are slightly more elaborate.  Another difference is that, as mentioned 
above, only the Georgia and Moldova AAs include provisions concerning their ‘frozen’ 
conflicts. For example, in the light of the presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia 
after the 2008 war, the parties underline in the Georgia AA “their full support to the 
principle of host nation consent on stationing foreign armed forces on their territories 
[…] and agree that the stationing of foreign armed forces on their territory should 
take place with the explicit consent of the host state, in accordance with international 
law” (Art. 5). Art. 9 of this agreement also reiterates the commitment of the parties 
“to peaceful conflict resolution in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized border as well as the 
facilitating jointly post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation efforts”. A similar 
provision is included in the Moldova AA with regard to the Transnistria (Art. 8(2)). In 
relation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), only the Ukraine AA requires the 
ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC because from these three countries only 
Ukraine still needs to ratify the Statute. This is complicated by a judgment of the 
Ukrainian Constitutional Court in 2011, which concluded that several provisions of 
the Rome Statute are not in conformity with the national constitution.7 However, also 
the two other agreements stress the importance of the implementation of the Rome 
Statute and the ICC.   
                                       
7 However, on 17 April 2014, the Government of Ukraine lodged a declaration under article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on its territory from 
21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014. Further, on 8 September 2015, the Government of Ukraine 
lodged a second declaration under article 12(3) of the Statute accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the ICC in relation to alleged crimes committed on its territory from 20 February 2014 onwards, with 
no end date. 
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1.3 Cooperation on Justice, Freedom and Security 
The provisions in the AAs’ Titles on Justice, Freedom and Security are also largely the 
same. These cover the promotion of rule of law, the protection of personal data, 
cooperation on migration, asylum and border management, combating organised 
crime and terrorism, tackling illicit drugs and legal cooperation. All three AAs do not 
provide new rules with regard to visa-liberalisation, but refer to the bilateral 
readmission and visa-facilitation agreements and the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans 
(VLAPs).8 However, several provisions in the Moldova and Georgia AAs are more 
detailed. For example, with regard to the protection of personal data, the Moldova 
and Georgia AAs state that data protection must be ensured in accordance with 
relevant EU legislation (e.g. Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2006/24/EC on data 
protection) and relevant Council of Europe Conventions. Or, with regard to 
cooperation on border management, the Moldova and Georgia AAs explicitly envisage 
cooperation with FRONTEX. But the most important difference relates to the 
treatment and mobility of workers. Only the Ukraine AA includes a provision on the 
treatment (Art. 17) and mobility (Art. 18) of workers. Whereas the latter only 
includes a best endeavours commitment to consider opening up the labour market, 
the treatment of worker provision includes a binding non-discrimination obligation 
with regard to workers legally employed in the territory of the other party. Workers 
who are legally employed in the territory “shall” be free of any discrimination on the 
basis of nationality as regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal 
compared to the nationals of that Member State. Because this provision includes a 
clear, precise and unconditional obligation, this provision can have direct effect. This 
means that Ukrainian nationals legally employed in the EU can invoke this provision 
before Member State courts or the Court of Justice of the European Union as a basis 
for requesting that court to dissapply discriminatory provisions. Indeed, third 
country-nationals have successfully relied on identical provisions included in other 
association agreements or even the PCA with Russia.9 Because such a provision is 
not included in the two other AAs, Georgian and Moldovan workers legally employed 
in the EU do not enjoy the same protection against discrimination based on 
nationality as Ukrainian nationals.   
                                       
8 Meanwhile Moldova (2014), Georgia (2017) and Ukraine (2017) have been granted a visa-free 
regime to the Schengen area. Nationals of the three countries who hold biometric passports can travel 
without a visa to the Schengen area for short stays up to 90 days.  
9 For a more detailed analysis of the direct effect of this provision, see G. Van der Loo, ‘The EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. A new legal 
instrument for EU integration without membership? (Brill, 2016). 
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2. The DCFTAs 
2.1 Trade in goods 
Concerning trade in goods, the provisions of the chapters on National Treatment and 
Market Access for Goods and Trade Remedies are very similar. All three agreements 
establish a free trade area for goods in conformity with Article XXIV GATT. However, 
the scope and pace of market opening and sector-specific safeguard measures or 
transitional mechanisms differ between the three agreements.  
With regard to the pace of tariff elimination, only the Ukraine and Moldova DCFTAs 
foresee a gradual and asymmetric trade liberalisation. ‘Gradually’ means that the free 
trade area will be progressively established of a period of maximum 10 years. 
Asymmetry implies that the EU reduces or eliminates its tariffs faster (in most cases 
immediately after entry into force) than Ukraine and Moldova. This gives the 
domestic producers in Ukraine and Moldova the opportunity to boost their exports to 
the EU market before facing full competition on the home market. Moreover, it has 
to be noted that both Ukraine and Moldova already benefited from unilateral 
preferential access to the EU market through EU autonomous trade preferences 
(ATP).10 
The EU removed immediately its import duties for most industrial goods and the 
remaining products (e.g. some chemicals, fertilisers, cars and motor vehicles) will be 
liberalised after a period between 3 to 7 years. Ukraine only had to immediately 
liberalise around 50 % of its exports of industrial products, but after a transitional 
period of severs years the share of EU exports liberalised by Ukraine will increase to 
96 %. Concerning agricultural products, the EU will also liberalise faster than 
Ukraine. However, the EU will apply TRQs to specific types of cereals, pork, beef and 
poultry and sugar. Ukraine will also keep applying tariffs on a limited number of 
agricultural products after the transitional period. In the Moldova DCFTA, the EU will 
immediately and fully abolish import duties on all Moldovan industrial products, 
whereas Moldova will phase out its tariffs over a period of 3 to 5 years. Similar to the 
Ukraine DCFTA, the EU will still apply TRQs to some agricultural products. Unlike the 
Moldova and Ukraine DCFTAs, the agreement with Georgia does not include 
transitional periods for the elimination of import duties. As noted in the introduction, 
this is because of the liberal reforms undertaken earlier by Saakashvili’s government, 
which in 2006 eliminated import tariffs for most products, making Georgia’s applied 
                                       
10 As a support measure the EU has unilaterally applied the DCFTA tariff regime to Ukrainian products 
between 23 April 2014 and 1 January 2016 as an ATM (the date of provisional entry into force of the 
DCFTA) (see Regulation 374/2014). The EU has already applied ATM to Moldova since 2008, first 
covering only industrial products, but after Russia’s import ban on several Moldovan agricultural 
products, the EU amended these ATM to extend duty-free treatment to Moldovan wine and to grant 
duty-free quotas for some fruits and vegetables (Regulation 1383/2014). The ATM applied until 31 
December 2015. 
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MFN WTO tariff rate one of the lowest worldwide (1.5%). The only exception to full 
tariff liberalisation is that the EU will still apply an annual TRQ for garlic. 
Another difference is that contrary to the Ukraine DCFTA, the Moldova and Georgia 
Agreements reduce and eliminate tariffs on the basis of a negative list. This means 
that these two DCFAs introduce a general obligation to “eliminate all customs 
duties”, except as provided in the relevant annexes to the agreement. Thus, the 
Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs only list the tariff lines which are excluded from the 
general liberalisation obligation. The Ukraine DCFTA on the other hand is less 
progressive as it lists all the tariff lines which are subject to tariff elimination or 
reduction.  
Another difference is that only Ukraine has obtained some sector specific 
concessions. With regard to Ukraine’s car sector, Ukrainian motor vehicles will not 
only enjoy a particularly long transitional period of 10 years, the DCFTA also foresees 
a specific safeguard mechanism for passenger cars.11 Another specific transitional 
mechanisms in the Ukraine DCFTA relates to the prohibition of export duties. 
Because Ukraine applies export duties on a number of products such as livestock and 
hide raw materials, sunflowers seeds and types of metal, the EU allowed Ukraine to 
gradually phase out its export duties during a period of 10 years. Moreover, a 
specific safeguard measure mechanism is provided for Ukraine’s export duties during 
a period of 15 years. 
The final important difference is that the Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs include an 
“anti-circumvention mechanism for agricultural and process agricultural products”. 
Pursuant to this mechanism, if the import from Moldovan or Georgian agricultural 
products listed in the corresponding Annex exceeds an average annual volume 
(“trigger volume”) in a given year, and in the absence of a sound justification by 
Moldova or Georgia, the Union may temporarily suspend the preferential treatment 
for the products concerned. 
2.2 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
The provisions in the three TBT chapters are also very alike. These include the 
affirmation of the WTO TBT Agreement, technical cooperation and rules related to 
marking and labelling. However, the approximation clauses included in these three 
TBT chapters include some important differences. The three countries committed 
themselves to “take the necessary measures in order to gradually achieve conformity 
with EU technical regulations and EU standardisation, metrology, accreditation, 
conformity assessment procedures and the market surveillance system”. But the 
specific nature (strong or soft obligation) and scope of the commitments is slightly 
                                       
11 Ukraine can hold its import tariff at the level of 10% for up to 15 years if during the previous year 
(i) imports from the EU exceed 45.000 cars or (ii) imports from the EU amounted to 25% newly 
registered cars. 
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different. Ukraine “shall” (strong obligation) incorporate the relevant EU acquis listed 
in the corresponding annex to the TBT chapter. This Annex does not refer to specific 
EU acts (i.e. reference to the name and number of EU Directives or Regulations), but 
instead mentions five specific areas or ‘titles’ of horizontal (framework) legislation 
and 27 areas of vertical (sectoral) legislation. The former actually covers the 
horizontal EU New Approach Directives which define the general rules and the 
institutional framework with regard to marketing of products, liability of defective 
products, accreditation, market surveillance and product safety.12 The vertical 
(sectoral) Directives define for specific product groups (e.g. lifts, safety of toys, 
medical devices, machinery) the “essential health and safety requirements” that 
products have to meet before they can be placed on the EU Market. Most of these 
Directives have to be implemented within two to three years, although some have 
four to five years. This body of EU legislation is currently being updated in the light 
of the New Legislative Framework, in particular of the EU’s Decision of 2008 on a 
common framework for the marketing of products, which aims to improve market 
surveillance and boost the quality of conformity assessments.13 Most likely the 
corresponding Annex in the Ukraine DCFTA does not include specific references to 
EU legislation because of these changes under way. In addition, Ukraine “shall” also 
adopt the ‘corpus’ of European standards, including the harmonised standards. These 
are developed by the European standardisation bodies (CEN CENELEC and ETSI) and 
have the “presumption of conformity” with the essential requirements, laid down in 
the sectoral New Approach Directives. Contrary to the New Approach Directives 
covered in the Annex, there is no timetable for the transposition of the standards. 
Finally Ukraine needs to progressively fulfil the conditions for membership of the 
European standardisation organisations. 
The TBT chapters in the Moldova DCFTA is practically the same as in the Ukraine 
agreement, however their corresponding annexes are different. The annex in the 
Moldovan TBT chapter is more ambitious than the Ukrainian (and Georgian) one 
because it covers in addition to the horizontal and sectoral New Approach Directives 
also a long list of EU legislation (around 80 EU Directives or Regulations) covering 
products that do not require CE marking (e.g. cosmetic products, motor vehicles, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals). For placing these products on the EU market, 
specific rules and procedures apply. Also the timetable is ambitious as Moldova had 
to approximate most of these directives by 2014 or 2015, and in some cases 2017 or 
2018. However, this timetable is flexible because the agreement allows Moldova to 
develop a new schedule if it has missed these deadlines.14 The Annex on Georgia’s 
                                       
12 Decision 768/2008/EC; Regulation 765/2008/EC; Directive 2001/95/EC.  
13 Decision No 768/2008/EC of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, 
and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC. 
14 The EU-Moldova Association Trade Committee adopted on 19 October 2016 Decision No 1/2016 
which updated Moldova’s TBT Annex. The new Annex includes now the updated New Legislative 
Framework Directives and a new timetable. 
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TBT chapter includes on the other hand softer and fewer approximation 
commitments. With regard to the sectoral Directives, the list in the Annex reflects 
Georgia’s approximation commitments as included in the Government of Georgia's 
Strategy in Standardisation, Accreditation, Conformity Assessment, Technical 
Regulation and Metrology and Programme on Legislative Reform and Adoption of 
Technical Regulations, of March 2010. The Annex recognises that some Directives 
have already been approximated and that other Directives have to be implemented 
within four, five, or eight years. With regard to the horizontal legislation, Georgia 
made a softer commitments compared to Moldova and Ukraine as the list of 
horizontal legislation only serves as “a non-exhaustive guidance for Georgia for the 
purpose of approximation of horizontal measures for the Union”.  
All three DCFTAs foresee that the contracting Parties can conclude an Agreement on 
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) covering 
several sectors once they have agreed that, after a check by the EU institutions, 
Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia have implemented the relevant Directives. An ACAA is a 
mutual recognition agreement which implies that products covered by the ACAA 
fulfilling the requirements for being lawfully placed on the market of one Party, may 
be placed on the market of the other Party without additional testing and conformity 
assessment procedures. Contrary to the Georgian DCFTA, the Moldovan and Ukraine 
DCFTA foresee strict verification procedures by the EU to check compliance with the 
annexed EU legislation. 
2.3 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
The chapters on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) are also almost 
identical. The Parties reaffirm their rights and obligations under the SPS agreement 
and include provisions on, inter alia, cooperation in the area of SPS, transparency 
and exchange of information, certification, verification, recognition of equivalence 
and import checks. However, similar to the TBT chapters, the corresponding annexes 
related to legislative approximation are different. All three agreements do not define 
a list of EU legislation to be approximated, but instead require the three countries to 
submit a comprehensive SPS strategy within three to six months after the entry into 
force of the agreement. However, only the Annexes in the Georgia and Moldova 
DCFTA include a section on “principles for the evaluation of progress in the 
approximation process for the purpose of recognition of equivalence”. These are 
specific approximation guidelines that specify how Moldova and Georgia need to 
implement the EU legislation included in the SPS strategies. 
So far, only the SPS Strategies for Moldova and Georgia have been adopted. Moldova 
submitted the draft to the European Commission in November 2014 and, following 
consultations with the European Commission it was finalised in July 2015. It was 
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approved by the EU-Moldova SPS sub-committee in June 2016.15 The Moldovan 
Strategy (i.e. “the list of Union legislation to be approximated to by Moldova”), 
includes around 240 EU acts, covering general issues related to food-safety, 
veterinary issues, placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, food 
safety rulers, phytosanitary issues, GMO’s and veterinary medical products. Most EU 
legal acts have to be approximated in the period 2016-2019. The Georgia Strategy 
on the other hand, adopted by the EU-Georgia SPS Sub-Committee in March 2017,16 
cover 272 EU acts. However, the implementation period is much longer compared to 
Moldova. A substantial part of these EU acts only have to be implemented in the 
period 2020-2026. The other part in the period 2015-2019. Both the preambles of 
the Moldovan and Georgian SPS Strategy state however that these two countries 
only “intend” to approximate this list of EU acquis, softening the legal commitment 
enshrined in the text of the agreement (i.e. “shall”). Ukraine prepared its SPS 
Strategy (adopted in February 2016 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) and 
submitted the proposal in June 2016. It was finalised in the spring of 2017, but still 
needs to be formally adopted by the EU-Ukraine SPS Committee.17 Whereas the final 
version of Ukraine’s SPS strategy is not yet public, earlier drafts indicate that Ukraine 
committed to implement around 255 EU acts.18 
2.4 Customs and Trade Facilitation 
The chapters on Customs and Trade Facilitation, which aim at reinforcing customs 
and trade facilitation matters by strengthening customs cooperation are also almost 
identical. There are only a few minor differences in the corresponding annexes 
related to legislative approximation. For example, the implementation period for 
Ukraine is shorter (1-3 years) compared to Moldova and Georgia (2 to 4 years). 
Moreover, whereas Georgia and Ukraine will need to implement only several 
elements of the EU Customs Code, Moldova has committed itself to implement the 
entire Customs Code Regulation.  
2.5 Services and Establishment 
The main text of the Services and Establishment chapters, covering establishment, 
cross-border supply of services and temporary presence of natural persons, are 
largely comparable. However, the respective annexes to these chapters, which 
include the specific market access and MFN commitments, national treatment 
obligations and the specific reservations of the parties, are different. It should be 
                                       
15 Decision 1/2016 of the EU-Moldova SPS Sub-Committee of 1 June 2016 (OJ, 2016, L 178/28). 
16 Decision 1/2017 of the EU-Georgia SPS Sub-Committee of 7 March 2017 (OJ, 2017, L 98/22). 
17 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the 
Union within the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Sub-Committee established by the Association Agreement 
between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, 
of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other (COM (2017) 265). 
18 The draft Ukraine SPS strategy is described in the EU-Ukraine DCFTA handbook (see footnote 1).  
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noted that it is difficult to compare the market opening for services created by the 
DCFTAs because the three countries had a different starting point for liberalisation 
(i.e. their specific commitments laid down in the GATS). For example, Georgia chose 
for a liberal approach towards trade in services when it joined the WTO, which is 
reflected in the limited number of reservations in its GATS schedules. Therefore, 
Georgia did not have much room for further services liberalisation in its DCFTA. 
Nevertheless, it can be noted that the EU will make more reservations in the list on 
establishment in the Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs compared to the Ukraine 
DCFTA.19 Moreover, only the Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs include a separate list 
with reservations with regard to key personal, graduate trainees and business 
sellers.20 
A notable difference between the three services chapters relates to legislative 
approximation and the additional market access linked to these approximation 
commitments. The Ukraine DCFTA includes in four sub-sections on Postal and 
Courier Services, Electronic Communications, Financial Services and Transport 
Services a binding legislative approximation clause: i.e. Ukraine “shall ensure that its 
existing laws and future legislation will be made gradually compatible with the EU 
accquis”. The corresponding annex includes a list of around 85 Directives or 
Regulations that have to be approximated and a timetable. Moreover, this annex 
establishes specific rules how Ukraine should implement this legislation, taking into 
account the relevant case-law of the CJEU and procedures to catch-up with 
legislative developments at EU level, and rules on monitoring. After the EU has 
determined, after a strict monitoring procedure, that Ukraine has effectively 
implemented these EU rules, the Trade Committee may grant reciprocal “internal 
market treatment” with respect to the services concerned. This internal market 
treatment means that there shall be no restrictions on the freedom of establishment 
of juridical persons of the EU or Ukraine in the territory of either of them and that 
juridical persons of one Party shall be treated in the same way as juridical persons of 
the other Party. This shall also apply to the freedom to provide services in the 
territory of the other Party. In practice, this means that for these four specific 
sections, the reservations of the EU and Ukraine to market access and national 
treatment, listed in the corresponding annexes, will be lifted. 
The Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs on the other hand do not include such a strong 
approximation clauses. Instead, the provision in the four above-mentioned 
subsections only state that the Parties “recognise the importance of the gradual 
                                       
19 In the EU-Ukraine DCFTA, regarding establishment, the EU party will make 24 horizontal 
reservations and 61 sectoral reservations whereas in the Moldova DCFTA, the EU party will make 33 
horizontal reservations and 129 sectoral reservations (Annex XXVII-A EU-Moldova AA)). In the Georgia 
DCFTA, the EU party will make 33 horizontal reservations and 128 sectoral reservations (Annex XIV-
A). 
20 Annex XXVII-C (EU party) and Annex XXVII-G (Moldova) EU-Moldova AA and Annex XIV-C (EU 
party) and Annex XIV-G (Georgia) EU-Georgia AA. 
THE EU'S ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS AND DCFTAS WITH UKRAINE, MOLDOVA GEORGIA | 13 
approximation of acquis” included in the annexes. Also the annexes mention that 
Moldova and Georgia only “undertake” to approximate to the listed EU legislation. 
The detailed rules on how to implement the EU acquis, included in the Ukraine 
DCFTA, are not taken over in the two other agreements. Moreover, contrary to the 
Ukraine DCFTA, implementation of this selection of EU legislation is not explicitly 
linked to the granting of “internal market treatment”.  
2.6 Public Procurement and IPR 
The public procurement chapters are almost completely identical. In the former there 
are only minor differences related to the thresholds21 and the timetable included in 
the approximation schedules, annexed to this chapter.22 The IPR chapters are also 
similar, however, the Moldova and Georgia agreements are less detailed, for example 
in the section related to trade-marks. Contrary to the Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs, 
the Ukraine agreement includes transitional mechanisms with regard to the 
protections of some Geographical Indications such as Champagne, Cognac, 
Parmigianino and Feta.23 
2.7 Competition 
The chapters on competition include some important differences as the Moldova and 
Georgia DCFTAs are less ambitious than the Ukraine DCFTA. With regard to antitrust 
and mergers, all three agreements introduce an obligation to maintain 
comprehensive competition laws and to establish an independent competition 
authority. However, only the Ukraine DCFTA takes over the TFEU provisions on 
cartels, abuse of a dominant position and concentrations (i.e. Art. 101 and 102 
TFEU) and includes some broad guidelines with regard to legal protections against 
decisions of such competition authorities. Moreover, only Ukraine has to approximate 
to a limited number of provisions of EU competition legislation (Article 256). Also 
with regard to state aid, only the Ukraine DCFTA has almost copy-pasted the 
relevant TFEU provisions, including the types of state aid that shall or may be 
considered to be compatible with EU law (Art. 107 TFEU). The Ukraine and Moldova 
DCFTAs (but not the Georgian) mention that it state-aid rules have to be interpreted 
in conformity with the case-law of the CJEU and relevant EU law. The Ukraine DCFTA 
also includes specific provisions on a domestic system of state-aid control. Such 
                                       
21 For example, the threshold for public supply and service contracts awarded by central government 
authorities, except for public service contracts, is 133 000 euro in the Ukraine DCFTA and 130 000 in 
the Moldova and Georgia DCFTA. 
22 For each implantation phase, Moldova and Georgia have one or two years more. Meanwhile, the EU 
and Moldova updated the “Indicative Time Schedule” included in the EU-Moldova AA in a Decision 
2/2016 of the EU-Moldova AA Trade Committee. 
23 Another difference is that the Ukraine DCFTA includes a section on “liability of intermediary service 
providers”. However, similar provisions are included in the services chapters of the Moldova and 
Georgia DCFTAs. 
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provisions are less detailed in the Moldova DCFTA or are, in the case of the Georgia 
DCFTA, absent. The Georgia DCFTA refers instead just to the WTO SCM Agreement.  
2.8 Trade-related energy and energy cooperation 
Also the DCFTA chapter on trade-related energy is more ambitious and detailed in 
the Ukraine DCFTA compared to the two other agreements. This is obviously the 
result of Ukraine’s crucial role a transit country for Russian gas and oil. Because 
Moldova is also a member of the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT), just as Ukraine, 
Moldova’s trade-related energy chapter is still largely similar to the Ukrainian 
agreement, with a few notable exceptions.24 The Georgia DCFTA is less detailed, 
however, it also includes provisions on transit, the relationship with the Energy 
Community Treaty and market principles. Noteworthy is that the Georgia DCFTA 
includes a provision stating that each Party shall ensure on its territory the 
implementation of a system of “third party access” to energy transport facilities and 
LNG and storage facilities. This third party access, which obliges the operators of 
transmission networks to grant third parties (i.e. companies other than their related 
companies) non-discriminatory access, is a crucial element of the EU’s third energy 
package. Members of the EnCT are obliged to implement this third energy package, 
including the third party access rule. Georgia was at the moment of negotiating and 
signing its AA not a member of the EnCT, However, through the DCFTA, it is obliged 
to implement a system of third party access.  Meanwhile, Georgia has completed its 
accession to the Energy Community Treaty (Georgia’s accession protocol was signed 
in October 2016 and the Georgian Parliament ratified it in April 2017) and has 
become a member on 1 June 2017.  
In addition to the DCFTA chapters on trade-related energy, all three agreements 
include also a chapter on energy cooperation in the AA’s Title on economic 
cooperation (see below). Again, the Ukraine chapter is more detailed. For example, 
in the light of the different Ukraine-Russia gas disputes that impacted EU energy 
supplies, only the Ukrainian chapter includes a specific “Early Warning Mechanism”, 
which is a mechanism that must provide for an early evaluation and rapid reaction in 
case of an emergency situation (or threat thereof)). Also more detailed provisions on 
cooperation in nuclear issues are incorporated, including provisions on the 
decommissioning of the Chernobyl nuclear plant. All three agreements also include 
legislative approximation commitments. The approximation commitments are softer 
than compared to other DCFTA approximation clauses as the three countries only 
“undertake’ to gradually approximate their legislation to the acquis annexed to the 
agreement. However, the Ukraine and Moldova agreements stipulate that listed EU 
legislation that is covered by the Energy Community Treaty will need to be 
implemented as set out in these agreements. Also the Georgian agreement 
                                       
24 For example, as a landlocked country, the Moldova DCFTA does not include provisions on 
hydrocarbon resources located in territorial waters. 
THE EU'S ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS AND DCFTAS WITH UKRAINE, MOLDOVA GEORGIA | 15 
anticipated Georgia’s accession to the EnCT and states that the annexed EU 
legislation “shall be implemented in accordance with the timeline agreed by Georgia 
in the framework of the Energy Community Treaty”. The scope of the approximation 
commitments is rather similar, covering EU legislation related to electricity gas, oil, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency and prospection and exploration of 
hydrocarbons. Only the annex in the Ukraine agreements includes nuclear-related EU 
legislation. 
2.9 Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Sustainable Development 
The DCFTA chapters on dispute settlement,25 transparency and sustainable 
development are almost identical. With the regard to the latter, only the Ukraine 
DCFTA makes a commitment to approximate its legislation to the EU acquis, 
however, no annex with relevant EU legislation is provided. The Moldova and Georgia 
DCFTAs include on the other hand more detailed commitments regarding multilateral 
environment agreements, the promotion of corporate social responsibility, trade in 
forest products and cooperation on trade-relates aspects of environment and labour 
policies, government consultations and biological diversity. 
3. Economic and Sectoral cooperation. 
In addition to the DCFTAs, all three AAs include a Title on economic and sector 
cooperation.26 These chapters cover a wide range of areas, including broad 
cooperation commitments and legislative approximation clauses.   
Most chapters on economic and sectoral cooperation in the three AAs are very 
similar, such as those on economic dialogue;27 taxation; statistics; transport; 
industrial and enterprise policy and mining; financial services; company law; 
accounting; auditing and corporate governance; information society; audio-visual 
policy; culture; tourism; consumer policy; employment; social policy and equal 
opportunities; public health; education training and youth; sport; civil society 
cooperation and participation in EU agencies and programmes and cross-border and 
regional cooperation. 
Some chapters are however slightly different. For example, in the area of 
environment the approximation clauses are not identical. The Ukraine AA includes 
references to EU acquis related to genetically modified organisms and only the 
Moldova and Georgia agreements cover EU legislation on chemicals (e.g. Regulation 
689/2008 concerning the export and import of dangerous chemicals and the REACH 
                                       
25 The Ukraine DCFTA includes a section on mediation in the body of the agreement. In the Moldova 
and Georgia DCFTAs this section is included in the annexes.  
26 The Georgia AA has a separate title for Economic (Title V) and “Other Cooperation Policies (Title 
VI). 
27 This chapter is titled Macro-Economic Cooperation in the Ukraine AA. 
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Regulation 1907/2006). Moreover, several chapters in the Georgia AA are less 
detailed. For example, the chapter on management of public finances is less 
comprehensive compared to the other two agreements. It relies instead on the policy 
paper on “Public Internal Financial Control”, approved by the Government of Georgia. 
Several approximation clauses in the tittle on economic cooperation also illustrate 
Georgia’s more reluctant approach vis-à-vis legislative approximation. For example, 
with regard to statistics, Georgia will only approximate to the EU acquis “wherever 
relevant”. Contrary to the Moldova and Ukraine AAs, the chapter on agricultural and 
rural development in the Georgia AA does not include a legislative approximation 
obligation. Moldova and Ukraine have committed themselves to approximate to the 
EU’s acquis related to food safety, organic farming, marketing standards for live 
animals, animal products, and plants, fruits and vegetables. However, these issues 
are nevertheless addressed in Georgia SPS Strategy (see above). There are also 
some obvious differences related to the countries’ geographical location. For 
example, the Moldova chapter on fisheries and maritime Policy is less detailed 
because it is a landlocked country and the Ukraine AA includes a specific chapter on 
the Danube river.  
Finally, some chapters are not included in some agreements. Only the Ukraine AA 
includes a chapter on cooperation in civil space research and space applications and 
the Moldova AA also covers a chapter on public administration reform; corruption 
and fraud; and the protection and promotion of the rights of the child. Contrary to 
the Moldova and Georgia AAs, the Ukraine agreement does not include a chapter on 
climate action and civil protection. 
4. General and final provisions 
Also the Titles on ‘General and Final Provisions’ are very similar. These Titles cover 
institutional provision (see above), general provisions on legislative approximation, 
dispute settlement and the duration and entry into force of the agreement. There are 
however notable differences related to the territorial application of the agreement. 
Only the AA’s with Moldova and Georgia explicitly prevent the application of these 
agreements in their respective ‘frozen conflicts’ or ‘breakaway regions’, i.e. 
Transnistria (Moldova) and Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia). The territorial 
application clauses of both agreements state that the AAs will apply “to the territory 
of [the Republic of Moldova/Georgia]”, but add a specific paragraph on the territorial 
application in relation to those areas “over which the Government of 
[Georgia/Moldova] does not exercise effective control”.  Without explicitly referring to 
Transnistria / Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is obvious that these territories are 
targeted. This specific paragraph states that the application of the AA or the DCFTA 
in these areas will only commence “once [Georgia/Moldova] ensures the full 
implementation and enforcement of this Agreement, or of [its DCFTA], respectively, 
on its entire territory”. The application needs to be activated by a decision of the 
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Association Council. Because the Association Councils decide by consensus, both 
parties, including the EU, must agree and confirm that Georgia or Moldova ensure 
the implementation and enforcement of the AA or DCFTA over these territories. 
Conversely, if a party considers that the implementation and enforcement cannot be 
guaranteed in these areas, the application of the DCFTA can be suspended in 
relation to the areas concerned. Whereas it is unlikely that the EU-Georgia AA or 
DCFTA will be applied in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the near future, the EU-
Moldova Association Agreement decided on 18 December 2016 that the Moldovan 
DCFTA (thus not the entire AA) shall apply to the entire territory of Moldova from 1 
January 2016, including Transnistria.28 Although the Moldova DCFTA entered 
provisionally into force from 1 September 2014, the ATM continued to apply until 31 
December 2015 (see above). Significantly, the decision of the Association Council 
confirming that the DCFTA will be applied to the entire territory of Moldova was 
preceded by a technical ‘deal’ between the EU, Moldova and the leadership of 
Transnistria.29 Because Transnitria was facing the end of preferential access to the 
EU with the termination of the ATP regime, the EU, Moldova and Transnistria 
launched informal discussions on how to extend the DCFTA to Transnistria from 1 
January 2016, after the termination of the ATP. The EU facilitated negotiations 
between the leadership of the breakaway region and Moldova on an agreement on 
the conditions that the separatist enclave has to meet in exchange for facilitated 
access to the EU market.30 Remarkably, the EU did not insist that the entire DCFTA 
needs to be applied in Transnistria, most likely because from economic, legal and 
political point of view this would not be realistic. However, this is actually 
incompatible with the territorial application clause of the DCFTA which states that the 
Association Council can only apply the entire DCFTA to Transnitria (and not only 
parts thereof).  
As noted above, the territorial application clause of the EU-Ukraine AA does not address the 
annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia because this situation occurred after the 
initialling of the agreement. However, the territorial application of the AA was addressed in 
the Final Act between the EU and Ukraine regarding the signature of the EU-Ukraine AA on 
27 June 2014. 31 In this document, the EU and Ukraine agreed that the AA -thus not only the 
DCFTA:  
                                       
28 Decision 1/2015 EU-Moldova Association Council of 18 December 2015. 
29 See for example Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission Question for written 
answer to the Commission, Ivan Jakovčić, 4 April 2016. In this answer the Commission also confirms 
that representatives of Transnistria region were invited to, and took part in observer capacity in, the 
negotiations on the DCFTA. 
30 This agreement has not been made public but is described in, inter alia, S. Secrieru, ‘Transnistria 
Zig-zagging towards a DCFTA’, PISM Policy Paper N. 4, January 2016. 
31 Final Act between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their 
Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards the Association Agreement, 
Council of the European Union (OJ, 2014, L 278/4). 
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“shall apply to the entire territory of Ukraine as recognised under 
international law and shall engage in consultations with a view to 
determine the effects of the Agreement with regard to the illegally 
annexed territory of the Autonomous republic of Crimea and the City of 
Sevastopol in which the Ukrainian Government currently does not exercise 
effective control”. 
Almost immediately after Russia’s annexation of Crimea the European Council stated 
that it does not recognise Russia’s annexation of these territories.32 Moreover, as a 
part of the EU's non-recognition policy, the Council imposed substantial restrictive 
measures on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol, including an import 
ban on goods from Crimea or Sevastopol into the EU (unless they have Ukrainian 
certificates) and trade and investment restrictions in several sectors, including a full 
ban on investment in Crimea or Sevastopol.33 On 17 June 2016, the Council extended 
these measures until 23 June 2017. 
Conclusion 
It is clear from the analysis above that the three agreements are very similar. 
However, in the light of the different economic situations and political preferences in 
the partner countries, some differences related to these agreements ‘comprehensive’ 
and ‘deep’ nature can be identified. 
With regard to the ‘comprehensive’ dimension of these agreements, they all three 
have the same broad coverage. The agreements address virtually all aspects of 
political and economic cooperation. The only notable difference related to coverage is 
that only the Ukraine AA includes an important non-discrimination clause for legally 
employed workers and that only the Moldova and Georgia AAs incorporate provisions 
related to their ‘frozen’ conflicts or breakaway regions. The structure and outline of 
the DCFTAs is almost identical. Only the Ukraine DCFTA includes specific safeguard 
or transitional measures (e.g. related to cars and export duties). 
However, there are some important differences with regard to the ‘deep’ dimension 
of the AAs. These are mainly related to the DCFTA and its approximation clauses 
(see Annex 1). Overall, the provisions in the Ukraine DCFTA are more far-reaching 
(e.g. in the area of services and competition), but there are some chapters where 
the Moldova or Georgia DCFTAs are more detailed or ambitious (e.g. the Moldovan 
TBT chapter). The heritage of the Georgia’s liberal trade policy under the Saakashvilli 
government is clearly illustrated in the DCFTA chapters on goods (e.g. no transitional 
periods and low MFN rate) and services. On the other hand, several chapters, such 
as the TBT chapter and those in the Title on Economic and Sector cooperation, 
                                       
32 European Council Conclusion, Brussels, 20/21 March 2014, EUCO 7/1/14, para. 29.  
33 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/ 
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demonstrate the Georgia was more cautious and realistic in its approximation 
commitments, both related to the nature (soft vs. strong) and coverage of the 
commitments.  
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Annex 1. Key differences between the three DCFTAs 
(DCFTA) Chapter Ukraine DCFTA Moldova DCFTA  Georgia DCFTA 
Market Access for 















export duties and 
textiles) 
No sector specific 
safeguard measures 
No sector specific 
safeguard measures 
Positive list for 
elimination of 
customs duties on 
import  
Negative list for 
elimination of 
customs duties  
Negative list for 
elimination of 








agricultural products  
anti-circumvention 
mechanism for 
agricultural products  
Technical Barriers to 
Trade  
No specific 
reference to the 
New Approach 
Directives 
Approximation to EU 
legislation for 
products not 








No “Principles for 
the evaluation of 
progress in the 
approximation 
process” included 
“Principles for the 
evaluation of 
progress in the 
approximation 
process” included  
“Principles for the 
evaluation of 
progress in the 
approximation 
process” included  
SPS Strategy not 
yet formally 
adopted 







(“shall ensure”)  
Soft approximation 
commitment 
(“recognise […] the 
importance” of 




“recognise […] the 
importance” of 
approximation to the 




No Internal Market 
Treatment envisaged 










procedures and rules 
to ensure the uniform 
interpretation and 
application of the 
No detailed 
monitoring 
procedures and rules 
to ensure the uniform 
interpretation and 
application of the 
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rules on anti-trust 
and mergers  
General provisions on 
antitrust and mergers  
General provisions on 
antitrust and mergers  
Detailed rules 
(TFEU-inspired) 
on state aid, 
including 
obligation to 
adopt system of 
state aid control, 
similar to that in 
the EU   
Detailed rules on 
state aid, however, 
no broad 
commitment to adopt 
system of state aid 
control 
No detailed rules on 
state aid but refers to 






rules and “early 
warning 
mechanism” 
No prohibition of 
customs duties and 
quantitative 
restrictions on the 




Only provisions on 
transit, relationship 
with EnCT and 
market principles. 
Also “third party 
access” clause.  






period for GIs. 
Less detailed rules 
than with regard to 





marks (e.g. no rules 
on grounds for 
revocation) and GIs 
(no transitional period 
or temporary 
measures) 
Less detailed rules 
with regard to 





marks (e.g. no rules 
on grounds for 
revocation) and GIs 
(no transitional 
period or temporary 
measures) 
Trade and 
Sustainable 
Development  
(vague) 
approximation 
clause (Art. 
290(2) 
No approximation 
clause  
No approximation 
clause 
 
